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Abstract 
Policies sometimes exempt particular categories of regulatees for reasons of equity and political 
feasibility. Will the non-exempted oppose the policy because they shoulder all the policy costs? 
We outline an analytic framework for “stress testing” public support among the non-exempted as 
they are provided with negative information about exemptions and reduced policy effectiveness. 
Empirically, we study the public support for the odd-even road space rationing policy. Using a 
survey experiment with 2,182 car owners in Bangalore, we find considerable baseline support for 
this policy. While the support among the non-exempted erodes when they are told about 
exemptions, there is no additional erosion when they are told that exemptions reduce policy 
effectiveness. This suggests that the perception of fairness, not policy efficacy, drive support 
erosion among the non-exempted. Yet, the policy survives the stress test because the majority of 
respondents continue to support it, inspite of support erosion among the non-exempted.  
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1. Introduction  
Policies and regulations sometimes grant exemptions to particular categories of regulatees for 
reasons of equity and political feasibility. While exemptions and side payments may help create 
a political coalition in support of a particular policy, they could also create a backlash from the 
non-exempted who might resent shouldering the policy costs while others are exempted. The 
issue of policy exemptions is critical in the context of environmental issues where policy makers 
seek to persuade actors (usually citizens and firms) to incur private costs to provide for 
environmental public goods (Hardin, 1968). Anticipating incentives to free ride, authoritative 
actors, be it governmental or non-governmental actors (Ostrom, 1990), establish policies to 
mandate, incentivize, or convince regulated actors to incur these costs.  
Support for environmental policies and regulations could be undermined when regulatees 
either disagree over the aims of the policy or resent the perceived asymmetries in the distribution 
of benefits and costs flowing from the policy. Regulatees may also oppose the policy if they have 
different capabilities to absorb policy costs. Hence, policy design should take into account the 
need for equitable (as opposed to equal) burden sharing that may require concessions to some 
categories of regulatees. Grandfathering clauses that exempt specific actors (temporarily or 
permanently) from new environmental regulations are one example. Suppose a new regulation 
requires power plants to substantially lower their pollution levels (Cramton and Kerr, 2002). 
Might this new rule affect all firms equitably? Consider two actors: an existing firm burdened 
with sunk cost in existing plant and machinery versus a new entrant with no such investments. It 
would be less costly for new entrants to meet the regulatory requirements by installing state-of-
the art technology. In contrast, for the firm with a relatively old plant, retrofitting might be 
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unduly expensive. Hence, regulators may grandfather old plants altogether, grant them extra time 
to retrofit, or sometimes even provide financial support.  
Yet, policy exemptions pose political challenges as well. Some regulatees might view   
exemptions as being granted for “political reasons,” and not to address any substantive inequity. 
They may also be concerned that exemptions could reduce the effectiveness of the policy. In that 
situation, non-exempted regulatees might feel that their “sacrifice” will be reduced in value or 
even in vain. This may motivate them to mount an opposition to derail the policy’s adoption. A 
crucial challenge for policymakers is thus to assess how an envisaged policy is viewed by those 
sub-populations with most incentives to mount an opposition to it. We call such assessment a 
“policy stress test.” 
To systematically examine how policy exemptions influence policy support, we outline 
an analytic framework. Two insights motivate this framework. First, public support for a policy 
could vary depending on the type of information about policy design provided to regulatees. For 
example, when information about policy exemptions and how they undermine policy 
effectiveness is provided, support for the policy might wane, particularly among the non-
exempted actors. The intuition is that as bounded rational actors, stakeholders’ (in our empirical 
case, individual car owners) support for the policy at hand is based on the information they 
receive. If the additional information portrays the policy in a negative light, support might 
diminish. Consequently, the robustness of public support, which is essential for most 
environmental policies, could be assessed via stress testing in which respondents receive 
different levels of negative information about the policy. 
Second, policies are adopted (or not adopted) if a sufficient political coalition can be 
mobilized in favor (or in opposition) of the policy. Groups that bear concentrated costs have 
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strong incentives to mobilize against the policy. Consequently, the second stress test should 
focus on assessing the level of policy support among actors on whom policy costs are 
concentrated.  Here as well, the robustness of their support (or opposition) could be assessed as 
regulatees receive different levels of negative information about the policy. Our framework thus 
provides a diagnostic tool to assess the robustness of public policy support as negative features 
of the respective policy are highlighted. 
Following this framework, we first test hypotheses about overall public support for a 
given policy (Hypothesis 1) and the support when regulatees are provided with information 
about ancillary benefits of the policy (Hypothesis 2). We then initiate the stress test by 
comparing support among exempted and non-exempted regulatees (Hypothesis 3). Because there 
might be preference heterogeneity within the non-exempted, we then compare policy support in 
two subgroups of the non-exempted. The first subgroup of interest is those who intensively use 
cars for their transportation needs and therefore face higher costs imposed by the policy. The 
second subgroup includes those who perceive the air pollution problem to be severe and those 
with a family member with respiratory problems, both of which should perceive high benefits 
from the proposed policy (Hypothesis 4). The insights thus gained can help policy-makers to 
target policy messages more specifically at different constituencies. Among the non-exempted, 
we further explore levels of policy support when negative information is provided that suggests 
that exemptions reduce policy effectiveness (Hypothesis 5). As in Hypothesis 3, we examine 
policy support in the two subgroups within the non-exempted regulatees.  
Our analytical approach could be useful for studying policy support in light of policy 
exemptions in a wide range of issue areas and countries. Policy exemptions are a tool to address 
equity issues as well as to construct political support. Yet, they can also raise concerns about 
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“policy capture” whereby non-meritorious groups are exempted, and also about reduced policy 
effectiveness.  
Empirically, we focus on a road space rationing policy known as the “odd-even” rule. In 
India, on which we will concentrate, this policy was first introduced in Delhi, and we assess 
public support for it, should it be extended to additional cities. Under the odd-even rule, private 
cars with odd registration numbers were allowed on the road on Mondays, Wednesdays and 
Fridays, while the ones with even numbers were allowed on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and 
Saturdays. No restrictions apply on Sundays. Car owners can thus use their car on three out of 
six days of the working week. On other days when they cannot use their car, they need to find 
alternative means of transportation to get to office, drive children to school, visit friends and 
relatives, and go to the market. Thus, the odd-even rule imposes very tangible private costs on 
car owners while creating a public benefit of reduced air pollution and congestion. 
Thus far, women drivers and two-wheelers were exempted from this policy, with much of 
the public debate focused on the former exemption. We are primarily interested in assessing 
policy support among (non-exempted) male drivers in response to various information 
treatments. Based on a survey embedded experiment with 2,182 randomly sampled car owners in 
Bangalore, we find considerable public support for costly road space rationing even among the 
non-exempted car owners. Importantly, policy support among the non-exempted did not erode 
even after they were told that exemptions reduced policy effectiveness. These findings suggest 
that policy exemptions may not invite backlash even among those with strong incentives to do 
so. Our results thus suggest that policy-makers in India are on relatively safe grounds in terms of 
public support when expanding road space rationing policies, along with gender-based 
exemptions, from Delhi to other parts of the country. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the empirical 
context of the odd even rule. In section 3, we outline our analytic framework and develop several 
hypotheses.  In section 4, we describe the study design. We then present the results and findings 
in section 5 and conclude in section 6.  
 
2. Urban Air Pollution and Road Space Rationing in India  
Urban air pollution is a major public health problem worldwide, particularly in developing 
countries. It stems from a range of sources, including households (notably, the use of wood, coal 
or dung for cooking or heating), electricity production, industry, construction dust, farming (e.g. 
burning fields after harvests in rural areas around urban centers), and transportation. Because the 
ill effects of air pollution are highly visible, there is often strong political pressure to address the 
problem. Environmental policies targeting motor vehicles are politically attractive in this regard, 
because vehicles and their emissions are highly visible and vehicles are responsible also for other 
problems, such as traffic congestion, noise, and accidents (Bernauer and Koubi, 2009; Cao and 
Prakash, 2010).  
This focus is, however, justifiable because vehicles are a major contributor to urban air 
pollution across the world. There are 1.2 billion vehicles in the world and this number is 
expected to reach 2 billion by 2035.1 Automobiles are important means of transportation. While 
they account for less than one-third of travel distance, they contribute 73 percent to urban air 
pollution. Over the years, policy-makers have battled the “traffic problem” in a variety of ways. 
They have created toll roads, introduced congestion pricing (Evans, 1992; Giuliano, 1994; 
 
	
1 http://www.greencarreports.com/news/1093560_1-2-billion-vehicles-on-worlds-roads-now-2-billion-by-
2035-report 
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Schuitema et al., 2010), reserved lanes for high occupancy vehicles (Dahlgren, 1998), banned 
specific types of vehicles during peak hours (Holguín-Veras et al., 2005), prohibited the use of 
diesel (Ben-Weiss, 2008), and restricted the use of personal automobiles based on license plate 
numbers.  In 1990, Singapore went even a step further than most other countries by imposing an 
upper bound on the number of personal vehicles and auctioning the right to own a vehicle to the 
highest bidder (Chin and Smith, 1997). Along with restricting unfettered and free access vehicles 
have to public roads, cities have also sought to increase the cost of complementary products or 
services, such as roadside or public parking (Bonsall and Young, 2009), and to reduce the cost of 
substitutes, notably public transportation (Calthrop and Proost, 1998; Chidambaram et al., 2014).  
Air pollution problems are particularly severe in India, the empirical focus of this paper. 
A recent study notes that outdoor air pollution contributes to half a million premature deaths 
each year in India (Ghude et al., 2016). Indian cities account for 7 of the 15 most polluted cities 
worldwide in terms of PM 2.5.2 New Delhi, in particular, is notorious for poor air quality. In 
response to a public interest litigation (MC Mehta v. Union of India), in 1998 the Supreme Court 
of India mandated that all city buses must be converted from diesel fuel to compressed natural 
gas (CNG) by March 2001. Auto-rickshaws, initially exempted, were later brought under the 
same rule. Yet, Delhi’s air pollution has worsened. The same applies to other major cities of the 
country, including Bangalore, on which we will concentrate in this paper. While air quality is 
subject to seasonal fluctuations, by some accounts, during 2016-2017 Bangalore exceeded 
 
2 http://www.businessinsider.com/the-cities-with-the-worlds-worst-air-pollution-who-2016-5/#15-kanpur-
india-115-gm3-of-pm-25-1 
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national ambient air quality standards for PM 10 and PM 2.53 and ranks behind Delhi as the city 
with the most acute air pollution problems. 4  
Air pollution from vehicles can be addressed through a variety of mechanisms. Why did 
the Delhi government introduce the odd-even rule and why did it exempt certain categories of 
regulatees? In 2015, the newly elected Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) government of the national 
capital territory (NCT) of Delhi announced that it would conduct a policy experiment to reduce 
air pollution, based on the odd even rule, during January 1-15, 2016, and again during April 1- 
15, 2016.  As noted above, under the odd-even rule, private cars with odd registration numbers 
were allowed on the road on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, while the ones with even 
numbers were allowed on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays (no restrictions on Sundays).  
Why the odd-even rule? Why not some other policy to tackle Delhi’s severe air pollution 
problems? Two issues are critical here. First, Delhi’s AAP government tends to espouse populist 
pro-poor policies. While car ownership has vastly increased in Delhi in the last decade, cars are 
still an elite item (Goel et al., 2015). Second, given the traffic situation in Delhi, something that 
is better experienced than described, complex policies such as congestion pricing pose almost 
unsolvable enforcement (and communication) challenges. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
AAP government favored a policy that posed fewer enforcement problems and imposed targeted 
costs on the more affluent parts of society: the car owning population. Furthermore, the 
legitimacy of the policy was enhanced because cities in other parts of world have used the odd-
even rule as well (Wang et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Jia et al., 2017). 
 
3 http://bangaloremirror.indiatimes.com/bangalore/others/air-pollution-in-city-leads-to-spike-in-lung-
diseases/articleshow/59852638.cms 
 
4 http://www.dnaindia.com/locality/bengaluru-central/bangalore-ranks-second-list-cities-highest-air-
pollution-levels-58926 
9 
Policy diffusion to new jurisdictions is often constrained by path dependencies. One 
reason is that policy design features in the “test market” create expectations about the 
distribution of benefits and costs. In our case, we are most interested in the issue of how 
exemptions influence political support among the non-exempted, and whether support levels 
change as additional information about policy features is provided to regulatees. We thus explore 
support for (or opposition to) policy exemptions if the policy were to be expanded to other 
locations. The odd-even rule tested in Delhi granted exemptions, the most prominent ones were 
women car drivers and two-wheelers. Two-wheelers were exempted for a variety of reasons, 
including that these are commonly used by the less affluent, and because of their very large 
number (5.6 million) restrictions on their use would overwhelm other modes of transportation5.  
Women were exempted in the light of difficulties they might face in using public transportation. 
Highly publicized instances of sexual assaults on women using public transportation 
(specifically, the Nirbhay6 case) made this a highly salient political issue7 not only in Delhi but 
all over India.  
Importantly, the odd-even rule was heavily criticized and legally contested because of the 
exemptions it provided. In response to a public interest petition, the Delhi High Court asked the 
Delhi government to explain why exemptions were granted to women and two wheelers.8 Some 
women celebrities, including prominent journalist Barkha Dutt, criticized the exemptions. She 
 
5 http://www.oneindia.com/india/odd-even-rule-explain-exemption-women-two-wheelers-hc-delh-
1969443.html 
 
6 http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/after-a-rape-and-murder-fury-in-delhi 
 
7 http://www.india.com/news/cities/supreme-court-says-wont-cancel-odd-even-rule-860840/  
 
8 http://www.oneindia.com/india/odd-even-rule-explain-exemption-women-two-wheelers-hc-delh-
1969443.html 
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tweeted:9 “@BDUTT  As a single woman, I dont want exemption from  #OddEvenFormula- 
think women who CAN must stand up & say so. Exemptions make me uncomfortable.”  
As is obvious from fierce debates over the policy in the media and policy circles, public 
opinion is crucial in this case, which is why studying the impact of exemptions on policy support 
is essential. While there is very little systematic public opinion data10, our own reading of the 
news media suggests that the odd-even rule was unpopular among Delhi citizens prior to its 
introduction.11 Many criticized the inconvenience it would cause and also believed that it would 
fail because it would be difficult to enforce and easy to circumvent: in fact, one poll suggested 
that 69% believed that this policy could not be enforced.12 In particular, there was opposition to 
exemptions, an issue that the Delhi High Court also became involved in. Yet, once the policy 
experiment was over (both after the first iteration in January and the second one in April 2016), 
public support for the policy appeared to have increased substantially (Schuitema et al., 2010), 
though systematic before-after comparison is not feasible due to lacking commensurable survey 
data.13 While in December 2015, 69% of the respondents believed that this policy would fail,14 in 
 
9 https://www.quora.com/AAP-government-exempted-women-drivers-on-odd-even-car-policy-Is-this-
first-step-towards-gender-equality-and-women-empowerment-in-Delhi 
10 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/TOI-poll-53-say-Delhis-odd-even-car-plan-is-a-bad-
idea/articleshow/50053722.cms 
 
11 http://www.financialexpress.com/economy/odd-even-formula-cars-not-to-blame-for-delhi-
pollution/183759/ 
 
12 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-69-of-delhi-believes-odd-even-car-formula-cannot-be-
implemented-survey-2157506 
 
13 After the January 2016 (and again in April 2016) policy experiment in Delhi, there were spates of 
claims and counter claims relating to its effectiveness (Pavani et al., 2016; Goyal and Gandhi, 2016; 
Mohan et al., 2017). Greenstone et al. (2015), probably the most prominent study on this issue, compare 
the PM2.5 concentrations in New Delhi before and after the policy experiment, and both within and in 
four areas in the neighboring states outside Delhi where this policy was not implemented. The authors 
find that the odd-even policy reduced PM2.5 levels between 10-13% on daily average, and an additional 
10% during office hours, 8 am-8 pm. By some account, including the Greenstone et al. (2015) study, the 
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February 2016, 78% agreed15 that it reduced pollution.16 New Delhi’s experience has sparked off 
discussions about the feasibility of making it permanent in New Delhi and extending it to other 
cities in India, which also suffer from extremely high pollution levels.17  We thus decided to 
examine public support for introducing the odd-even rule outside Delhi, based on a survey 
embedded experiment with 2,182 car owners in Bangalore,18 a thriving metropolitan city with 
acute air pollution problems where introducing the odd-even rule has been considered.19  
 
3. Analytic Framework and Hypotheses  
 
reductions in peak time pollution amounted to around 20%. Additional benefits included reduced 
congestion, and building a feeling of solidarity among Delhi residents about jointly pursuing a common 
task. It seemed that Delhi citizens relied more on public transportation: an estimated 5.3 million people 
commuted by bus per day during the period when the odd-even rule was in place (4.7 million in previous 
weeks). Delhi Metro’s daily ridership rose from 2.6 million to 2.75 million during the policy experiment. 
 
14 http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-69-of-delhi-believes-odd-even-car-formula-cannot-be-
implemented-survey-2157506 
 
15 http://www.abplive.in/india-news/abp-news-nielsen-opinion-poll-arvind-kejriwal-to-form-government-
in-delhi-with-48-seats-people-back-his-schemes-289395  
 
16 A recent study suggests that air pollution actually increased during the policy experiment phase because 
citizens switched to exempted vehicles such as two and three wheelers which tend to be more polluting 
(Chandra et al., 2018). 
 
17 See, for example, Mumbai: http://www.automotiveml.com/blog/mumbai-traffic-authorities-implement-
delhi%E2%80%99s-odd-even-rule-navi-mumbai; Chennai: 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/Odd-even-scheme-definitely-feasible-in-city-
Experts/articleshow/50545204.cms; Bangalore: http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/are-you-
ready-for-oddeven-formula/article7964066.ece; Hyderabad:  
http://www.deccanchronicle.com/151209/nation-current-affairs/article/city-test-odds-evens 
 
18 http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/bangalore/govt-considering-oddeven-formula-for-cars-in-
city/article8047052.ece; http://bangaloremirror.indiatimes.com/bangalore/cover-story/Not-odd-Even-city-
is-looking-at-Delhi-plan/articleshow/50068324.cms  
 
19 http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/a-bengaluru-neighbourhood-s-toxic-air-
portends-india-s-future-115041100200_1.html 
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Scholars of “mass politics” tend to focus on the role of mass organizations in initiating and 
sustaining political action (Gabel, 1998; Mettler and Soss, 2004). In this literature, issues of 
collective action challenges in interest group mobilization, and the political and resource 
mobilization strategies of advocacy groups become important. Our focus is on mass policies that 
directly affect a large number but not on the strategies or structures of advocacy groups that 
support or oppose such policies. For example, policies that mandate motorcyclists to wear 
helmets directly affect the behavior of a large number of motorcyclists (Vogel, 1990). But the 
support for or opposition to such policies are not necessarily mediated through mass 
organization. Because mass policies intrusively influence the lives of a large number of citizens, 
understanding the public response to them is crucial to understand the policy dynamics, 
including why they are adopted or not adopted. Another way to think about this issue is that 
some policies that directly influence citizens might be mediated through interest groups or 
political parties (Kitschlet, 2000), while in other cases, policy makers are directly 
communicating with mass publics.  Social media, particularly Twitter, has certainly encouraged 
such direct politics where political actors directly communicate with mass publics without the 
intermediation of interest groups (Grant et al., 2010).  
The odd-even rule is an example of a mass policy that directly affects the behaviors 
(transportation options via the permission to use their car) of a large number of citizens or 
regulatees, and opposition/support to this policy is not mediated by interest groups. Thus, the 
role of public opinion is crucial in such policy arenas because it provides guidance to policy 
makers and thus influences the likelihood of policy adoption and eventual implementation. 
To guide our empirical enquiry, we outline a five-step analytic framework for studying 
how policy design (policy exemptions in our case) might cause policy backlash and therefore 
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undermine policy support among regulatees. The insight motivating this framework is that 
policymakers need to anticipate reactions to a proposed policy from regulatees with 
heterogeneous preference. We suggest that for mass policies the likelihood of their adoption and 
successful implementation depends not only on how well they are perceived overall, but also on 
how the subpopulations that are adversely affected respond to them. Sometimes policy adoption 
is derailed because those who are potentially hurt by the policy are motivated to oppose it, 
especially if the policy imposes concentrated costs on them, while the policy beneficiaries are 
not expressive or vocal in their support. While policymakers are advised to explore the 
possibility of building a winning coalition, we suggest that policy makers should also assess the 
policy support (opposition) among those subpopulations with the greatest incentives to oppose 
the policy20. We view this as a “stress test”. The idea is to study whether the graduated provision 
of negative information erodes support for the policy among the subgroup with the strongest 
incentive to oppose the policy.  
Based on this insight, we propose a five-step policy “stress test”. In step 1, we examine 
support levels for a policy in response to the description of the overall policy approach, without 
providing information about policy features that impose differentiated costs or benefits across 
regulatees, or undermine policy effectiveness. If at the aggregate level the policy has scant 
support, the likelihood of its adoption and effective implementation is small. This could be 
viewed as the baseline support level. 
In step 2, we further examine baseline support by treating all study participants with 
information about positive spillover (or ancillary) effects of the policy. This information is about 
non-excludable public benefits as opposed to excludable private benefits flowing from the 
 
20 Because we are examining public opinion, and not interest group maneuvering, we are not focusing on 
veto points and other institutional obstacles to policy adoption. 
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policy. We provide information to evoke respondents’ sense of public responsibility (such as 
helping to solve a pressing problem) or their national pride.  Empirically, we highlight two types 
of ancillary benefits of the odd-even rule: contributing to climate change mitigation (public 
responsibility) and strengthening Indian’s global leadership in climate change mitigation efforts 
(national pride).   
In step 3, we examine support among actors/regulatees with different opportunity costs of 
complying with the policy. In our empirical application, we provide information about policy 
exemptions for female drivers. We are interested in assessing how this information influences the 
level of support among non-exempted male drivers who bear the full policy cost, whereas the 
exempted female drivers do not.  Additionally, we also compare support levels between two 
other subgroups relevant to the exemptions issue, exempted drivers of two wheelers and the non-
exempted car drivers, though we pay less attention to this distinction because it has attracted 
much less public debate. 
In step 4, we focus on non-exempted male drivers only. This is due to two reasons. First, 
much of the controversy over exemptions pertains to gender-based exemptions. Second, we have 
an insufficient sample size to examine subgroups within the non-exempted for two wheeler 
owners. Thus, in step 4, our objective is to assess whether policy support varies within subgroups 
among the non-exempted male drivers. In particular, we focus on subgroups that face 
particularly high costs of policy adoption and/or a subgroup that has (in our specific case, 
ironically) an offsetting reason to favor the policy. Insights from this analysis can allow policy 
makers to target their policy messages more carefully at different constituencies even among the 
non-exempted.  
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The first subgroup of interest is those who intensively use cars for their transportation 
needs and therefore face higher costs imposed by the policy. Arguably, the intensity of 
opposition to exemptions could be particularly high in this subgroup, as opposed to the rest of 
the non-exempted. The second subgroup includes those who perceive the air pollution problem 
to be severe and those with a family member with respiratory problems, both of which should 
perceive high benefits from the policy. Both of these groups will probably like to see a reduction 
in air pollution, but they might resent policy exemptions and the fact they have to shoulder the 
policy costs. Yet, their policy opposition may be lower because they feel that some policy action 
is better than none. This is akin to Olson’s (1965) “privileged group” where some actors are 
willing to incur the cost of collective action because they expect to receive high levels of  
benefits from it. Thus, step 4 allows us to delve deeper into the preferences of different 
subgroups amongst the non-exempted, thereby providing a more nuanced understanding of 
potential opposition to the policy.   
In step 5, we increase the “stress” on the policy by highlighting how policy exemptions 
reduce policy effectiveness. In doing so, we put additional emphasis on unfavorable aspects of 
the policy design, and examine how the non-exempted group responds to this information. As in 
step 4, we recognize that there might be heterogeneity in preferences among the non-exempted. 
We therefore assess whether the provision of negative information about reduced policy 
effectiveness due to exemptions erodes policy support within the two subgroups. Arguably, 
support among those using their vehicle intensively might erode (compared to the previous stage 
when this information was not provided) because they might feel that the value of their sacrifice 
is undermined or even wasted. Among the other subgroups – those who believe that the problem 
is severe or those with a family member with respiratory problems—we expect some frustration 
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with exemptions. Perhaps, information on the exemption-effectiveness link will erode their 
support for the policy as well compared to the previous stage when this information was not 
provided.  Our analytic framework is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Hypotheses on Policy Support 
Substantively, we examine support for a road space rationing policy in India that seeks to reduce 
urban air pollution. Based on our analytic framework, we propose several hypotheses. While 
both female drivers and two-wheelers were exempted from this policy, the main controversy 
over exemptions emerged in the context of women drivers. Hence, we focus primarily on policy 
support among women car drivers (exempted from the rule) and male car drivers (not exempted 
from the rule), although we also test a subset of hypotheses for two-wheelers.  
We begin with an assessment of the baseline of support in two ways. Without some base 
level of overall public support, the chances of policy adoption and effective implementation are 
slim. Although prior to its introduction in Delhi the odd-even rule was unpopular, it appears to 
have gained in popularity once it was introduced. This also led to demands that it be extended to 
other cities in India.  Given intense air pollution problems, people in Bangalore are probably 
influenced by the “warm glow” of the odd-even rule in Delhi.  Hence, as the first step, we 
provide all respondents with basic information about the odd even rule without focusing on 
policy exemptions. 
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Hypothesis 1:  The Odd-Even Rule presented in general terms will receive a high level of 
support among all respondents, both male (non-exempted) and female 
(exempted).  
 
Second, we bring in the issue of ancillary benefits as drivers of baseline support. While the odd-
even rule was aimed at improving local air quality, it also has global implications. We therefore 
focus on a positive feature of the policy as reflected in spillover effects. We treat respondents 
with new information about how the odd-even rule could help in mitigating climate change, a 
pressing problem that gets a lot of media attention in metropolitan India, and on how this rule 
could help India demonstrate global leadership, which speaks to rising nationalism in India. 
Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2a: Information on climate change mitigation ancillary benefits of the odd-
even rule is likely to enhance support for the odd-even rule among all 
respondents. 
Hypothesis 2b: Information on how the odd-even rule will enhance India’s global 
leadership in climate change mitigation will enhance support for the odd-
even rule among all respondents. 
 
Having examined overall levels of support, we begin with the policy stress test. While the policy 
is likely to receive a high level of support when it is described in general terms, support might 
erode among the non-exempted when they are provided with information about policy features 
that concentrate costs on them. Hence, we propose the first “stress test.” The logic is that those 
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bearing most of the policy burden are likely to believe that either the exemptions are unfair, or 
resent bearing the disproportionate burden for this policy. While not central to our study, we also 
propose a hypothesis regarding exemptions to two wheelers. Therefore, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Additional information about policy exemptions reduces support among the non-
exempted (male car owners) relative to the exempted (women car owners). 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Additional information about policy exemptions reduces support among the non-
exempted (car owners) relative to the exempted (owners of two wheelers 
 
We recognize that there might be heterogeneity in preferences among the non-exempted. For 
example, even the non-exempted might have another reason such as health issues to support the 
policy, no matter how imperfect. As we noted previously, given the sample size issue, we limit 
this hypothesis to the gender dimension of policy exemptions. Therefore we propose:  
 
Hypothesis 4:  When provided with additional information about policy exemptions, within the 
non-exempted (male car owners), policy support among the subgroup with higher 
intensity of car use is lower than support among the subgroup that views air 
quality problems as severe and the subgroup with family members experiencing 
respiratory problems.  
 
In step 5, we increase the stress on the policy by highlighting how its specific design feature of 
policy exemptions reduces policy effectiveness. The logic is that those bearing the burden of 
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policy implementation may feel abused when they realize that their sacrifices could be 
undermined by behaviors of the non-exempted. Yet, as the previous step, the level of erosion will 
vary among different subgroups. Therefore, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 5a:  Policy support among the non-exempted (male car owners) erodes when 
they are told that exemptions reduce policy effectiveness. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: Within the non-exempted (male car owners), policy support among the 
subgroup with higher intensity of car use erodes more than among the 
subgroup that views air quality problems as severe and the subgroup with 
family members experiencing respiratory problems. 
 
4. Study Design 
To test the above hypotheses, we implemented a survey embedded experiment with 2182 car 
owners in Bangalore from 24 January – 26 February 2017. Two pilot tests with N=200 and 
N=400 respectively were carried out in December 2017 to assess and improve the survey 
instrument (see also below). The survey languages were English and Kannada, the local 
language (participants were free to choose).21 To facilitate the interviewing of women, the team 
included two female interviewers. We oversampled slightly on women (resulting in 19% of the 
sample) to obtain sufficient statistical power for analyzing whether those exempted exhibit 
stronger policy support, with interviewers selecting women car owners in a household where 
 
21 The survey experiment was designed by the authors. The data collection was undertaken in face-to-face 
form by Across Research & Communication Pvt. Ltd. (headed by Ved Prakash Sharma, 274-D Beldari 
Tola Anshik, Mahmoodabad Sitapur, Uttar Pradesh, India). 
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both a man and a woman owned a car. Because we wanted to compare exempted and non-
exempted car owners, our sample includes car owners who may or may not own two wheelers 
(male and female), but not non-car owners owning or not owning two wheelers. This restricts our 
comparison of exempted and non-exempted individuals to gender based exemptions.  
In the Online Appendix, we show the interview locations across the city and provide the 
balance table. Out of 198 wards in Bangalore, 30 wards were randomly selected. They differ 
substantially in terms of demographics and average income levels. The average age of 
respondents was 37.3 (min=18, max=80). 36.8% had an education level less than Bachelor, 
63.2% a Bachelor degree, similar or higher. Also, driving by women is fairly common: 77% of 
women respondents note that they have used their car in the past four weeks. The average 
interview duration was 12.45 minutes.  
The survey also included standard socio-demographics, such as an individual’s sex, age, 
education, and number of children. We also account for an individuals’ automobile use, 
including items on whether they own a car or motorcycle and how many hours in a week they 
use these vehicles. Finally, we included items relating to health and pollution concerns, capturing 
individuals’ beliefs about the severity of air pollution as well as whether they or anyone in their 
family suffered from related health issues (see the online appendix for the questionnaire). 
We assessed public support for (opposition to) the odd-even policy, the dependent 
variable in the analysis, via the following question: “Would you oppose or support introducing 
the odd-even rule for private cars in Bangalore?” Scale: Strongly oppose, Oppose, Neither 
oppose nor support, Support, Strongly support.  
For the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a control (placebo) or 
treatment group. The information on what the odd-even rule is, which all groups received, and 
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then the treatment conditions, which only those in the respective treatment group received, 
consisted of text and illustrations that were handed out to survey participants in hard-copy form. 
The rest of the survey was completed on tablets. The hard-copy format for the treatment 
conditions was chosen based on the results of the two pilot tests, where many participants 
expressed a preference for this approach in the most demanding (experimental) part of the 
survey.  
As illustrated in Figure 2, all participants received one (hard-copy) page with basic 
information on what the odd-even rule is (without any information on exemptions and policy 
effectiveness). We preferred this conceptualization of the control (baseline) group over not 
giving the control group any information on what the odd-even rule is.  This approach creates a 
common baseline for all groups, that is, basic information about the design and objectives of the 
odd-even rule), and then allows us to examine the effects of additionally treating randomly 
assigned participants with information on exemptions and other aspects of the odd-even rule. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
After receiving basic, neutrally worded information on the odd-even rule, the control group then 
received what can be considered a placebo treatment, stating that: “This odd-even policy has 
been widely discussed in the media, by politicians, and by transportation experts. The crucial 
issues are who should be subject to the odd-even policy, whether the policy is effective, and 
whether it makes sense to put this burden on car owners in order to reduce air pollution.” We 
prefer this placebo approach because it creates more homogenous conditions across groups in 
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terms of survey length. The treatment groups received the following information, shown in 
summary form in Table 1 below.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
To assess whether participants understood the information they received, all participants were 
then asked to respond to questions that revealed their comprehension of the odd-even rule. 
Participants assigned to the treatment groups were asked to respond to an additional item 
assessing whether they understood the treatment. Respondents who provided a wrong answer to 
any one of the comprehension checks were asked to look at the hard-copy handouts once again. 
They were then asked to continue the survey (without having to respond to the comprehension 
checks again). This approach follows an “intention to treat” logic, which we think is more 
realistic than forcing participants to re-read the treatment again and again until they provided 
correct answers to comprehension check items.   
Figure 3 shows summary information on prior knowledge of the odd-even policy (items 
before the experimental part was administered). It shows that the large majority of survey 
participants in Bangalore had heard of the odd-even policy in Delhi, and that they were able to 
correctly answer all or most of five questions about the basic features of this policy. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
For the results, we focus on two issues: (1) policy support estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares regression (OLS) and (2) a quantitative measure we develop to assess of whether a 
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policy passes or fails the stress test. Our explicit stress test captures the idea that whether a 
majority supports or opposes a given policy is of importance. It is possible that a policy loses 
overall support due to intense opposition from specific subgroup. Thus, with the provision of 
negative information to the non-exempted stress, we can assess not only the erosion of support 
among this group but also how this affects overall support for the policy.  
Therefore, we estimate, using an ordered logit, the ratio of individuals who support the 
odd-even policy relative to those who oppose the odd-even policy, given individual 
characteristics (e.g. treatment status and whether they are exempt or not). We therefore define a 
failure of the stress test to be the situation where a policy that previously had more support than 
opposition (ratio > 1) subsequently has more opposition than support after the stress test (ratio < 
1). Given this definition, significant negative treatment effects are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to fail the stress test. While a negative treatment effect will cause support relative to 
opposition to decrease, it may not be sufficient to cause the number of people supporting the 
odd-even policy to be less than the number who oppose it. Therefore, we only present stress test 
estimates for cases where we find negative treatment effects. 
To estimate the proportion of individuals who support or oppose the odd-even policy we 
use a Bayesian ordered logit. The ordered logit allows us to estimate which category of 
support/opposition is most likely for a given individual in a straightforward manner. We estimate 
this using a Bayesian approach as this allows us to easily present the uncertainty in the 
proportion we expect to support the policy compared to those expected to oppose the policy. 
Such uncertainty is important as it allows us to make probabilistic statements about whether the 
policy passes a given stress test or not. 
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5. Results 
We begin with a general discussion of support levels for the odd-even policy, which speaks to 
Hypotheses 1 and 2, and then present the results aimed at Hypotheses 3-5, our policy stress test.  
Figure 4, panel on the upper and lower left, shows that a majority of respondents support the 
introduction of an odd-even policy, similar to the one introduced in New Delhi, with 68% in the 
control group and 67% in treatment groups combined “supporting” or “strongly supporting” it 
(N=2182). We also find that differences between men and women, the groups which 
characterized the main exemption in the previous implementation of the policy, in the control 
group are rather small, although women express strong support more often. This finding lends 
strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Next we examine how this baseline support changes when all respondents are informed of 
ancillary benefits of the policy. As outlined in Hypotheses 2a and 2b, emphasis on how the odd-
even rule could help global climate change mitigation efforts or improve India’s global standing 
may bolster support for the policy. 
Figure 5 displays the results relevant to this hypothesis. We can see that emphasizing the 
international benefits of the odd-even policy, whether it be in reducing emissions or increasing 
India’s global leadership, does not lead to a significant increase in support for the odd-even 
policy. This is the case both on average and when looking at the groups we have examined 
previously relating to policy exemptions. 
 
Insert Figure 5 here 
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We now turn to examining Hypotheses 3a and 3b, how exemptions impact the level of support 
for the odd-even rule. As shown in Figure 6, while information about exemptions can lead to a 
decrease in support for the odd-even policy, it is dependent on the type of exemption. Examining 
the average treatment effects, respondents who receive information that the odd-even policy 
would exempt women are significantly less likely to support the policy (Hypothesis 3a). In 
contrast, there is no significant negative effective for exempting two-wheelers (Hypothesis 3b). 
This result suggests that individuals are sensitive to the form of exemption.  While debates on 
sexual harassment are continuing at high levels of intensity, it seems that study participants, on 
average, do not believe that exemptions granted to women are fair. Yet, they do not seem to react 
negatively to exemptions granted to two wheelers. While we do not have any direct evidence to 
explain this divergence, we offer two speculations. Arguably, two wheelers are viewed as 
vehicles for the less economically privileged and therefore worthy of exemptions. Second, 
because of the small size of two-wheelers, they are not viewed as major contributors to pollution. 
Insert Figure 6 here 
 
We also examine how the effect of including exemptions changes dependent on whether an 
individual is in the exempted group or not. In the case of the exemption of women from the odd-
even policy, we can see that the negative effect of this exemption is driven by those individuals 
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who would not be exempted by the policy, men. In contrast, the exemption neither significantly 
decreases nor increases women’s support for the odd-even policy. 22 
We now turn to Hypothesis 4, which deals with heterogeneity in the effect of exemptions 
within the two subgroups of the non-exempted. In this case, we are restricted to examining only 
the women exempted condition, as there are too few two-wheeler owners in the sample to 
reliably estimate such conditional effects and our sample does not include people not owning a 
car but owning a two-wheeler. As outlined previously we expect that non-exempted individuals 
may tolerate exemptions in some circumstances, dependent upon their personal situation. Figure 
7 displays how the effect of including a female exemption varies dependent upon individuals’ 
perceptions of air quality, whether there are asthma sufferers within the family, and the extent of 
their car use. 
 
Insert Figure 7 here 
 
In general, we find some evidence that these information inputs moderate the impact of female 
exemptions amongst the non-exempted. For air quality and asthma cases, we find that the 
negative effect of exemptions is strongest when these individuals believe air quality is good and 
when there are no asthma cases in their family. This is surprising because individuals do not 
have intrinsic interests in reducing air pollution and yet they are reasoning negatively about 
exemptions for women. Nevertheless, it should be noted that while the negative effect is 
statistically significant when individuals believe air quality is good and when there are no asthma 
 
22 We do not have data on the overlap between the ownership of cars and two-wheelers. Hence we cannot 
compare the effect of two-wheeler exemptions on policy support between exempted and non-exempted 
groups. 
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cases, this effect is not statistically significantly different compared to when individuals believe 
air quality is bad and with asthma cases respectively (Gelman and Stern 2012). Therefore, this 
provides partial support for the hypothesis that there is heterogeneity amongst the exempted. The 
negative effect of a female exemption is constant across all levels of car use, suggesting no 
moderating effect. 
Figure 8 displays the results for Hypothesis 5a. In general, we see that these results are 
consistent with those found when examining Hypothesis 3. Support for the odd-even policy is 
significantly reduced when respondents are told that women will be exempted, with this effect 
being driven by those who are not exempted (men), while no such effect is found for the case of 
two-wheelers. Importantly, we can see that these effects do not significantly change for 
respondents who received information stating that these exemptions would reduce the 
effectiveness of the proposed policies. This lends further credence to the idea that respondents 
react negatively to exemptions when they are considered as unfair, rather than as a response to 
the potential impact upon the outcome of the policy. Thus, it is the perception of fairness, instead 
of perceptions about policy efficacy that are driving reductions in support for the policy. 
 
Insert Figure 8 here 
 
Figure 9 addresses Hypothesis 5b, which extends Hypothesis 4 to assess the increased policy 
stress by providing information that female exemptions reduce effectiveness. The results 
generally match those shown in Figure 7, as can be seen by the overlapping confidence intervals, 
this difference is not significant. 
Insert Figure 9 here 
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Finally, we estimate our explicit measure for passing/failing the stress test: whether the erosion 
of support among the non-exempted is sufficient to tip the majority vote against the policy.  
 
Insert Figure 10 here 
 
Figure 10 displays the results of the stress test for information on female exemption. We can see 
that female exemptions, particularly when combined with information that it would reduce 
policy effectiveness, causes a decrease in the ratio of individuals supporting to those opposing 
the odd-even policy amongst those who would not be exempt (males). However, in spite of the 
negative treatment effects for female exemptions amongst the non-exempted (males), this 
negative effect is not sufficient to cause the ratio of people supporting to opposing the odd-even 
policy to be less than 1, which would have constituted a failure of the stress test. 
Figure 11 displays the results of the stress test among the two subgroups among the non-
exempted males. We present the results for perceptions of air quality and asthma cases within a 
family, as these moderators led to the significant negative treatment effects necessary for the 
policy to possibly fail the stress test. In this case we can see that in some circumstances the odd-
even policy fails the stress test. For both treatments, the stress test is failed when looking at 
individuals who believe that air quality in Bangalore is very good or good. This is also the case 
for those who have no asthma cases in their family when receiving the exemptions treatment that 
primes respondents about its negative effect upon effectiveness. 
However, if we look at the broader picture, we can see that as a whole the odd-even 
policy still manages to pass the stress test. In our sample, very few people perceive the air quality 
as good or state that there are no asthma cases in their family. Thus, if we weight the results of 
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these stress tests by the proportion of individuals in each sub-group (as displayed by the black 
line distribution), we can see that the odd-even policy still passes on the aggregate. 
 
Insert Figure 11 here 
 
In summary, we find that support for the odd-even policy in Bangalore is robust. While 
exemptions for two-wheelers do not lead to a significant decline in support, we find that 
exemptions for women significantly decrease support, primarily driven by those who would not 
be exempted (men). This difference in support between the exempted and non-exempted 
suggests that individuals are sensitive to “fairness” concerns. Conversely, exempting two-
wheelers may be seen as legitimate and fair as they have lower emissions than automobiles and 
tend to be owned and used by less affluent parts of society.  
As an extension to our focus on explaining general policy support, we also asked 
respondents about their willingness to financially support policy implementation. While an 
individual might be willing to offer political support for the odd-even rule, s/he might not be 
willing to pay personally for its enforcement because s/he thinks it is the government’s job to do 
so. We were curious to assess whether policy support would erode when respondents were asked 
to financially support the implementation of the policy. This might be important with a view to 
the case of New Delhi because a substantive part of the enforcement work may have to be done 
by volunteers along with the traffic police. For instance, volunteers could approach cars at traffic 
lights if they were driving on wrong days. They could tell them that they are breaking the law 
and hand them a pamphlet about pollution. We therefore asked: “Making sure that car drivers 
follow the odd-even rule is a challenge. Would you be willing to donate 500/1000 Rs {value 
30 
randomly assigned} to pay for food and other facilities for volunteers to help enforce the odd- 
even rule in Bangalore?” Respondents could then select one of three response categories: yes, 
perhaps, or no.  
The results, which are displayed in the online appendix, closely mirror those with regards 
to general support of the odd-even policy presented earlier. When faced with a costly choice 
(1000Rs) to help the odd-even policy, support is lower and female exemptions have a significant 
negative effect, particularly amongst men. In contrast, we observe no significant negative effects 
of exemptions upon support for the 500R donation. These results further echo that exemptions 
unrelated to the policy goal of reducing pollution can significantly dampen both the support for 
the policy as well as the willingness to voluntarily contribute to its enforcement, thereby 
potentially weakening its effectiveness. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper proposes a policy stress test concept to examine how policy exemptions influence 
public support for a policy that imposes differentiated costs on the regulatees. It applies this 
concept to a particular empirical case to demonstrate its usefulness. The stress test seeks to assess 
the robustness of policy support when regulatees are provided with different levels of negative 
information about the policy, especially the exemptions it provides and how such exemptions 
influence policy efficacy.  
The empirical analysis suggests that general support for introducing the odd-even rule in 
Bangalore is surprisingly high and robust, particularly in view of the fact that our sample focuses 
on car owners who face high opportunity costs from rather severe restrictions on using their 
personal vehicles. We thus think that support for the odd-even rule among the non-car owning 
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mass public is likely to be even higher, because of lower opportunity costs. Even though car 
owners are likely to be politically more vocal and influential than other parts of the population, 
our finding suggests that it is politically feasible for policymakers to introduce the odd-even rule 
in Bangalore.  
Our findings have broader relevance, both for research on regulation and governance, and 
for policy making. For academic research, we offer a framework for systematically examining 
the implications of one crucial aspect of environmental policy design (exemptions) for the 
political feasibility of policies, assuming that public acceptance is essential to effective problem 
solving. Application of our framework to urban air pollution problems in other areas of India and 
other countries, and to other environmental policy areas where exemptions are being used or 
considered is straightforward and relevant. While there is a significant amount of research on 
public acceptance of road space rationing in general (Wang et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2016; Jia et 
al., 2017), this is among the first papers to use an experimental approach for assessing the 
implications of exemptions for policy support. 
For policy-making, we offer an approach for assessing public support for environmental 
policy designs that include exemptions. In essence, such research can help anticipate problems 
that may result from trying to get a new policy adopted in the first place by granting exemptions, 
but then running into difficulties over reduced policy effectiveness and opposition by the non-
exempted. We did not detect a substantial trade-off problem in this regard in the Bangalore odd-
even rule case, which bodes well for attempts to implement this rule there, and also in other large 
cities of India.   
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Figure 1: A Stress Test for Assessing Policy Support 
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Figure 2: Information on the Odd-Even Rule, Given to all Survey Participants 
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Figure 3: Prior to Treatment Knowledge of Odd-Even Policy 
 
 
Note: the item used for the graph on the right side listed six statements on what the odd-even 
policy does. Some statements were accurate, some not. The figure shows that the large majority 
gave correct answers as to whether a statement was accurate or not. 
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Figure 4: The distribution of support for the odd-even rule, dependent on whether the individual 
is in a treatment condition or not, and also by their sex. 
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Figure 5: The effect of framing upon support for the odd-even policy. Each panel displays the 
treatment effect for the relevant emphasis frame, that is the difference in the average level of 
support for the odd-even policy comparing those who receive information about international 
efforts or leadership compared to those who do not. Both the average treatment effect and 
treatment effects conditional upon exemption status are shown. Lines indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. Results from models with and without covariate adjustment are both displayed. 
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Figure 6: The effect of policy exemptions upon support for the odd-even policy. Each panel 
displays the treatment effect for the relevant exemption, that is the difference in the average level 
of support for the odd-even policy comparing those who receive information about an exemption 
compared to those who do not. Both the average treatment effect and treatment effects 
conditional upon exemption status are shown. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results 
from models with and without covariate adjustment are both displayed. 
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Figure 7: How exempting females affects support for the odd-even policy amongst the non-exempted 
(males), conditional upon perceptions about air quality, family asthma prevalence, and car 
usage. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Results from models with and without covariate 
adjustment are both displayed 
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Figure 8: How the effect of policy exemptions upon support for the odd-even policy changes 
when given information about how exemptions harm efficacy. Each panel displays the treatment 
effect for the relevant exemption, that is the difference in the average level of support for the 
odd-even policy comparing those who receive information about an exemption compared to 
those who do not. Both the average treatment effect and treatment effects conditional upon 
exemption status are shown. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Dark points and lines 
display the treatment effect for information about exemptions without efficacy information, while 
light points and lines display the treatment effects including the additional efficacy information. 
Results from models with and without covariate adjustment are both displayed.  
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Figure 9: How exempting females and information about how this impacts policy efficacy affects 
support for the odd-even policy amongst the non-exempted (males), conditional upon perceptions 
about air quality, family asthma prevalence, and car usage. Lines indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. Dark points and lines display the treatment effect for information about exemptions 
without efficacy information, while light points and lines display the treatment effects including 
the additional efficacy information. Results from models with and without covariate adjustment 
are both displayed. 
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Figure 10: Results from the stress test for exemptions. The distributions show the posterior 
distribution of the ratio of support to opposition for the odd-even policy. The dark shaded 
distributions show the ratio for those who would be exempt in a given treatment, while the light 
shaded distributions show the ratio for those who would not be exempt. The distribution 
indicated by a black line is the ratio ignoring exemption status (i.e. the average of the exempt 
and non-exempt ratios, weighted by the proportion of exempt/non-exempt in the sample). The 
vertical dashed line indicates the value of 1, the point where support and opposition are equal. 
Values larger than 1 indicate higher support than opposition, with values less than 1 indicating 
the opposite. 
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Figure 11: : Results from the stress test for males in the case of female exemptions, allowing for 
heterogeneity based upon car usage, perceptions of air pollution, and family asthma prevalence.. 
The distributions show the posterior distribution of the ratio of support to opposition for the odd-
even policy. The shaded distributions correspond to the stress test results by sub-group, with 
colour indicating a particular sub-group. The distribution indicated by a black line is the ratio 
ignoring exemption status (i.e. the average of the ratios by sub-group, weighted by the 
proportion of exempt/non-exempt in the sample). The vertical dashed line indicates the value of 
1, the point where support and opposition are equal. Values larger than 1 indicate higher 
support than opposition, with values less than 1 indicating the opposite. 
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Table 1: Treatment Conditions 
 
  Group Information 
Control  Control (placebo) group See above 
T1 Hypotheses 1  Effectiveness Odd-even policy has reduced air 
pollution by up to 20 percent 
T2 Hypothesis 2a Ancillary benefits Information that odd-even policy 
reduces not only local air pollution, 
but also contributes to international 
efforts against global warming. 
T3 Hypothesis 2b Climate benefits, India’s 
leadership 
Similar to above, but emphasis on 
demonstrating India’s leadership in 
international efforts against global 
warming. 
T4 Hypothesis 3a Exemption for women Women are exempt from the odd-
even policy because of sexual 
harassment risk and difficulties in 
finding alternative transportation. 
T5 Hypothesis 3b Exemption for two-
wheelers 
Two-wheelers are exempt from the 
off-even policy because their users 
tend to have lower incomes and 
fewer alternatives to commute. 
 Hypothesis 4 Focus on two subgroups 
within non-exempted 
male car owners 
(sub group analysis and 
not a different treatment 
frame) 
 
T6 Hypothesis 5a Exemption for women, 
reduced effectiveness 
Same information as above, plus: 
information that this reduces air 
pollution by only 10 instead of 20 
percent.  
T7 Hypothesis 5b Exemption for two-
wheelers, reduced 
effectiveness 
Same information as above, plus: 
information that this reduces air 
pollution by only 10 instead of 20 
percent. 
 
